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To stimulate the efficient reallocation  of labor, transitional
economies should direct resources away from programs to
preserve  jobs and into programs  to create new  jobs; allow for
flexible determination  of relative wages but retain incomes
policy; and build support  for reform  by promoting  cooperation
among  parties involved  in collective  bargaining.
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This paper  - a product  of the  Transition  and Macro-Adjustment  Division,  Policy  Research  Department
- is part of a larger  effort in the department  to investigate  how  labor markets  work  during the transition
of socialist  economies.  It is one of the  outputs  of the research  project  "Labor  Market  Dynamics  during  the
Transition  of a Socialist  Economy"  (RPO  677-20)  funded  by the Bank's Research  Support  Budget,  This
paper  was prepared  for the 24th National  Convention  of the Ameriwan  Association  for the Advancement
of Slavic  Studies,  held in November  1992  in Phoenix,  Arizona.  Copies  of this paper  are  available  free  from
the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Sabah  Moussa, room N1-
017, extension  39019 (July 1993,  37 pages).
Yugoslavia  (including  Slovenia)  has been more  And to increase  the flexibility  of adjusting  firms'
market-oriented  than the rest of Eastem Europe,  workforces,  transitional  economies  should
with little or no planning  and healthier  legislate  simple  layoff procedures  and should  not
development  of product  markets.  UJntil  recently,  assign  finns the responsibility  for financing
however,  the labor market in Slovenia  was  redundant  workers.
subject to form.dable  constraints.
s It may be easy to demolish  the old system  of
But sweeping  legislative  changes  and a  determining  wages,  but it is difficult  to develop  a
drarn tic change  in the climate  of the Slovenian  new,  well-functioning  system.  One country
economy  have produced  major shifts in the  canmot  simply  copy another's methods.  It is
allocation  of Slovenia's  labor force.  Most  important  to provide  for a minimum  wage,  but it
important,  the Rubicon  of job security  has been  is inefficient  to establish  a complete  wage
crossed:  Slovenian  workers  - who  like other  structure,  or to provide  for automatic  cost-of-
Yugoslav  workers  were more protected  from  job  living  adjustments  which  hinder wage
loss than workers  in most socialist  countries  - moderation  and make  the wage  structure
can now be laid off. Partly as a result  of layoffs  inflexible.  Moreover,  while  state and social
and bankruptcies,  there has been  a dramatic  ownership  prevail, an incomes  policy  is a must.
increase in unemployment  - from 1.5  percent in
the mid-1980s  to 12.5  percent  in January 1993.  * The trial and error approach  to finding  the
Moreover,  social sector  employment  decreased  right mix of active  labor market  policies is
17.6  percent from December 1989  to December  unavoidable.  But governments  should evaluate
1991,  and the labor  force participation  rate  the effectiveness  of such  programs  and weigh
dropped  by nearly 8 percentage  points.  them against  alternative  policies ained at
reducing  unemployment  - notably  increased
Among  lessons  learned  about  the labor  public  spending and investment  tax credits.
market in Slovenia's transition  to a market
economy:  * Unilateral  government  action  is
counterproductive.  To overcome  mutual hostility
Governments  in transitional  economies  tend  and achieve  cooperation,  governments  should,
to preserve  current  jobs through  employment  among  other things, consult  with trade unions  on
subsidies  and by subsidizing  early retirement.  To  the legislation  and programs  to be introduced,
stimulate  the efficient  reallocation  of labor,  they  and wage a public relations  campaign  to
should  redirect  resources  away from programs  to  demonstrate  the unavoidability  of reforn and to
preserve  jobs into programs  to create  new  jobs.  emphasize  program  successes.
'  Te  Policy Research Working PaperSeTies  disseminate thefindings of work under way in the Bank. An objective of the series
is to get these fundings out  quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The finJings,  interpretations, and
conclusions in these papeTs do not nePessarily represent of  Ricial  Bank policy.
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Soviet Union are beginning to fundamentally restructure their
economic and political systems, with the clear goals of becoming
market economies and multiparty democracies.  Reform of the labor
market --  which in these economies were gravely rigid  --  is
essential to these efforts.
Yugoslavia's self-management system has often been regarded
as a third way, a system fundamentally different from those in
other socialist economies.  Jut the difference has been
exaggerated. In fact, the Slovenian labor market has shared the
key features of the labor market in other socialist economiej:
heavy social sector employment;  full employment together with
substantial hidden unemployment; heavy female participation in
the labor force; a relatively well-educated labor force; heavy
employment in industry; little geographical mobility; an
egalitarian wage structure; over-generous fringe benefitL3;  and
government and worker involvement in wage determinaticn.
Fundamental reform of the labor market is as essential in
Slovenia as in all of the formerly socialist economies.
It is also true that Slovenia is atypical in certain
respects.  First, Yugoslavia --  including Slovenia --  was
historically more market-oriented than the rest of Eastern
Europe.  The absence of not only central, but virtually any
planning --  a striking difference from other Eastern European
economies  --  influenced the working of Yugoslav product markets
and contributed to the emergence of both tangible infrastructure
(such as communications,  financial, and banking systems andmarketing units in firms) and intangible infrastructure
(producers' networks).'  Second, Slovenia is wealthier than most
other regions of Eastern Europe, so there is reason to suspect
that making the transition to a market economy there may be less
wrenching than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.  Even should this be
true, however, analyzing the problems encountered in this "best
case" situation should be illuminating.
In this paper, we describe the transition of the Slovenian
labor market to date, and draw lessons relevant for other
econo.nies  undergoing transition.  As part of comprehensive
economic reform, the Slovenian labor market has in the last three
yeprs undergone major transformations.  Above al', the Rubicon of
job security has been crossed:  Sloven'an workers --  who were,
together with other Yugoslav workers, more protected from job
loss than workers in most socialist countries --  can now be laid
of  f.2 Labor mobility is facilitated by more flexible hiring
legislation, and collective bargaining has replaced the rigid
system of wage determination that prevailed under self-
management.  But numerous shorte-Aings remain:  redundancy
legislation is inconsistent and still overrestrictive; the major
institutional players in collective bargaining neither trust each
other nor cooperate; cash and fringe benefits remain too
't  But factor markets were exempted from this "marketization."  Until
recently, there were formidable constraints on the working of the
labor  market  and  capital  allocation  was  controlled  mainly  by
politicuians  !aee Prasnikar and Svejnar 1988).
2/  Unlike consto..utions  in other transitional economies, Yugoslavia's
constituticn forbade layoffs.  Yugoslavia amended its conptitution
in 1988 to  al.low  for layoffs.
2generous;  there is no incomes  policy  nor are there  coherent
active  labor  market  policies.
After characterizing  the Slovenian  labor  market,  and recent
shifts  in market  reallocation,  we describe  recent  institutional
reforms,  analyze  current  problems,  and conclude  with lessons
learned.
1.  FEATURES  OF THE BLOVENIAN  LABOR  MARKET
In most important  respects,  the Slovenian  labor  market  has
closely  resembled  the labor  market  in other  Eastern  Bloc
countries. We describe  its  chief  features  br..efly.
Heavy Social  Sector  EmDlovment. One profoundly  influential
feature  of socialist  economies  has been  heavy  state  and social
ownership  and the dearth  of private  enterprise. The Yugoslav
republics  have been somewhat  more  permissive  about  private
enterprise  than  other  Eastern  European  countries,  but the social
sector  accounted  for almost  85 percent  of Slovenian  employment  in
1988 (table  1).  In 1988,  agriculture  accounted  for over  half of
Slovenian  private  sector  employment,  and nonagricultural  private
sector  employment  comprised  only 6.8  percent  of total  employment.
Hidden  UnemRlovment. Slovenia  has suffered  from
considerable  hidden  unemployment, 3 partly  because  of
constitutionally  guaranteed  job  security, 4 and  pa.-tly  because  of
3/  Inefficiencies  of  the  so-called  full-employment  syndrome  are
discussed  in  Vodopivec  (1991a).
4/  Based  o0  on  ampirical  analysis  of  Slovenian  firms,  Vodopivec  (1991b)
identifies  ir  firm  redistribution  of income  as  the  mechanism  that
allows  job  bs_.  ity  to persist  in reforming  socialist  economies.
3TABLE  1:  SLOWMIAM  LAs4  roRCE,  1981-19°1
(Cnd of  the  year,  In  thousalde)
1981  1982  198  494  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  ¶9O  1991
Social  sector  eto  _mnt  780  786  792  03  814  U8  838  831  820  751  676
X of  n  44.8  45.2  45.4  45.4  45.6  45.9  46.0  46.3  46.5  48.7  47.3
Priveat  sgric.  .aploent  108  103  101  96  104  99  98  103  99  98  97
S of  n  55.8  51.8  55.2  56.0  53.0  5s.o  52.8  52.7  52.3  52.0  51.3
Private  non-aeric.  No.  49  S2  54  s7  64  68  67  67  69  70  77
s  of  w  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.2
Untpioyant  12.0  14.0  16.0  15.0  15.0  14.0  18.0  25.4  33.8  55.4  91.2
X of  womn  7.1  56.8  55.3  54.3  53.7  51.1  48.8  47.3  48.9  47.9  44.7
Labor force  - zotol  949  951  963  971  997  1009  1021  1026  1022  974  941
X of  woen  45.6  45.9  45.9  45.9  4S.7  45.8  45.9  46.1  46.2  4r.9  46.3
mrawe  itamm
tspltoimnt  rate  (Slovenis  1.3  1.5  1.7  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.8  2.5  3.3  s.?  9.7
Lhspl.  rate--Yugoslavia  8.6  9.0  9.4  9.9  10.4  10.7  10.5  11.0  11.6  12.8  ..
Labor force  part.  rate  78.1  78.0  78.1  78.4  80.1  80.8  82.0  61.5  80.9  76.8  73.1
mn  71.8  72.0  72.2  72.4  73.  74.6  75.8  75.7  75.4  74.1  68.2
Non  84.S  83.8  83.9  84.2  86.3  86.9  88.1  87.2  66.4  79.5  77.9
Labor  force  rorth  --  0.6  0.8  0.8  2.7  1.2  1.2  0.5  *0.4  -4.6  -3.4
Nler  of  retiree  26  284  293  304  316  327  340  357  375  397  423
Ratio  opltoyes/retfrse  3.4  3.3  3.2  3.1  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.6  2.3  2.0
Working age poWtaticn  1215  1225  1233  1239  1244  1249  124s  1259  1263  1269  1288
SourcOs:  Statistical  Yrcrbook  of  Stlvenie.  ver1om  l1ase;  Statistical  Yearbook of  Yugtlevia,  varios  issues;  Statiaticat
Office  of  Slovenisend  Yar.  r  on  Social  Protection  fn  Slovenis,  1991.
Notess  Particfpation  te  is  definrd  as  the  labor  force  Ss  a  Perc ntag  of  the  workifn-a  popultatfon  (15-59  for  women.  15-64
for  men).  tn  1990  I  uploent  rate  for  Yugoslavievis  tinted.  Won's  share  in  the  wrking-ge  popuation,  wnd the  shar
of  women  in  non-agricultural  private  opl9tuent*  ar  setisteg  of  the  Statistical  Office  of  Slovenia.  The mrdar  of
retfree  at  the  erd  of  the  year  wa  estinted  frm  yearly  averes.
political  pressures  to hire. 5 Mencinger's  (1989)  estimate  of  the
rate  of hidden  unemployment  (redundant  workers as a percentage  of
total employment)  for Slovenia's  social  sector  was 13.5  percent
in 1988.  Underuse  of work  time (a  proxy  for hidden  unemployment)
in other  socialist  economies  has ranged  from 10 to 30 percent
(Vodopivec  1991a). As in other  socialist  economies,  but unlike
the rest of Yugoslavia,  open  unemployment  was virtually  unheard
5/  Prasnikar and others (1990)  provide a  fruitful  theoretical  and
empirical  investigation  of determinants  of employment  behavior  of
Yugoslav  firms.
4of in Slovenia  until  very  recently.'
Hevy  Femse  PartIcilation  in the  Labor-Force. The male
labor  force  participation  rate ir.  Slovenia  has been comparable  to
that in most OECD  countries,  but the female  participation  rate
has been  much higher (table  2).  Slovenia  shares  this  high female
TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES, 1989
(percentages)
Total  Women  Men
Slovenia  79.4  74.4  84.4
Socialist economies
Yugoslavia  64.5  55.6  73.3
Czechoslovakia  87.3  84.6  89.C
Poland  80.2  77.2  82.9
Romani&  84.2  80.6  87.3
Soviet Union  78.0  72.0  t'.0
Selected OECD countries
Austria  67.2  54.3  80.4
France  65.6  55§7  75.4
Germany  68.2  E4.5  82.8
Greece  59.8  43.4  75.6
Italy  60.7  44.0  77.8
Japan  73.4  59.3  87.2
Spain  58.6  39.9  77.4
Sweden  83.3  81.0  85.6
United Kingdom  76.0  65.2  86.8
United States  76.8  67.9  85.9
Sources: Table 1; OECD Employment Outloak, OECD, Paris, July 1990;
IMF, IBRD, OECD, and EBRD, The Economy of USSR, 1990; Statistical
Yearbook of Czechoslovakia, 1990; Statistical Yearbook of Poland,
1990; World Bank, Romania: Accelerating the Transition: Human Resource
Strategies for the 1990. (Report  No. 9577-RO), May 1991.
Notes:  Participation rate is defined as the labor force as a percentage
of the working-age population.  The working-age population is 15-64; except
for Yugoslavia and Slovenia (15-59 for women, 15-64 for men); Czechoslovakia
(15-55 for women, 15-60 men); Poland (18-59  women, 18-64 men); and Romania
(16-55 for women, 16-59 for men).  Because of differences in the definition
of working-age population, participation rates for socialist countries tend
to be biased upward.  For France, Germany, and Greece, women's and men's
participation rates are for 1988.
6/  Unlike other  socialist countries, Yugoslavia has allowed for the
existence of open employment since the 1950s, but kept it low until
the early 1970s.  Unemployment rose during  the  stagndnt  years  of  the
1980s,  and reached a historical peak of 12.8 percent in 1990 (see
table  1).
5participation rate with other socialist countries.  (The overall
participation rate has been significantly higher in Slovenia than
in the rest of Yugoslavia, but similar to that in other Eastern
European countries.)
gelatively Well-Educated  Abor  Force.  The Slovenian labor
force, like those in other Eastern European economies, is better
educated than labor forces in the developing world or the
Southern European countries (table 3).  The Slovenian labor force
averages 9.3 years of education, which is slightly less than the
average for socialist economies (9.5 years' and not far below the
average for the developed market economies  (10 years).
TABLE  I:  LEVEL  OF  EDCATION IN  THE  LBl  FORCE
Percenttag  of  the  tabor  force  uith  mean  years
of  schooling
No  Primry eckcation  Secondary education  Higher
eAction  (coqpeted  or  (capieted  or  education
uncomleted)  utcaqteted)
Slovenis  (1958)  0.0  32.6  61.8  5.6  9.3
MSitlist  countries-(average)  2.2  39.4  52.4  5.9  9.5
Yugoslavia  (1981)  r.  52.5  35.9  4.2  5.6
Bulgaria  (1975)  4.0  67.6  22.5  5.9  8.7
Czechoslovakia  (1980)  0.0  37.5  55.7  6&8  11.5
HunIary (1980)  0.7  28.2  62.7  8.4  10.4
Polid  (1978)  1.3  8.6  84.7  5.4  10.7
Romnis  (1977)  0.0  42.1  53.0  4.9  9.8
Developed _arket  comcriea  0.4  27.1  56.1  16.3  10.0
Southern  European costries  12.5  59.1  20.6  7.8  5.9
middle  East  wc  North Africa  50.2  29.8  15.9  3.6  3.4
East  Asiaend the  Pacific  16.1  *  5.0  33.0  5.8  6.4
Sources:  Statistical  Yerrtkook of  SI-vetois  (.t  calcutation  for  the  mean  years  of  schooting  in  Stovenia);  C.
Psccharopoutoes and  0 .M.  ta-riasadoa  lte  dxcational  Caqosition  of  Labor  Force:  An  International  CoMpariSon.
Inter.aticnal  Labour  Review,  Vol.  1!5.,  ho.5,  1986.
motes:  The data  refer  to  format  edszation.  Developed mnrket  economies  are:  Austris,  Belglunm  Canada.
Defmnrk,  Finland.  Frnc,e  Uest  Ger*wnv. Japan, Netherlanda  New Zealand,  Woray,  Suitzertlnd,  ad
united  stotes  (date  from  1975-82).  Sctlerm  European comntrios  are  Greece,  PortugUl.  Spain.  ad  Turkey
(date  from  1980-81).  Middle  E"t  .. 'Z  North  Afrca  countrioe  are  Afghanistan,  Algeria,  Bahrain,  Egpt.
Iran,  Jordan,  Kuwait,  Lebanon.  hor.co.  Qater,  Syria,  Tunisia,  United  Arab  Emirates,  d  Y_an  (date  from
197O081).  East Asia  nd  PacflI.  crs1tries  art  Chine,  laiwn,  Fiji,  Hong Kong.  Indone  Is,  Korea,  Malaysia.
New  Caledonia,  Phiofppirne,  S,nrapore, Ihailand,  srs  Tongs  (date fron  1974-63).
6Concentration  of Jobs in Industry. As in other  Eastern
European  economies,  Slovenian  jobs  are heavill  concentrated  in
industry. In 1989,  over 44 percent  of workers  were employed  in
industry,  10.9  percent  in agriculture,  and 45 percent  in services
(table  4).  High-income  OECD  count'ries  have  much larger  service
sectors  than  the Eastern  European  countries  do.  Slcvenia  s
underdeveloped  services  thus offer  ample  opportunities  for
TABLE  4:  THE  RELATIVE  COMPOSITION  OF  EMPLOYMENT,  1989
(Percentage)
Agriculture  Industry  Services
Slovenia  10.9  44.1  45.0
Socialist  countries
East Germany  10.3  45.4  44.4
Czechoslovakia  11.7  47.1  41.1
Bulgaria  19.3  46.3  34.4
Scviet  Union  20.2  35.2  44.6
Hungary  21.1  38.6  40.3
Yuqoslavia  25.0  36.0  39.0
Poland  29.9  39.7  30.4
Selected  OECD countries
Austria  8.0  37.0  55.1
France  6.4  30.1  63.5
Germany  3.7  39.8  56.5
Italy  9.3  32.4  58.2
Spain  13.0  32.9  54.0
Portugal  19.0  35.3  45.7
Sweden  3.6  29.5  67.0
United  Kingdom  2.1  29.4  68.4
United  States  2.9  26.7  70.5
Sources:  Table  1; Statistical  Yearbook of Yugoslavia,  varicus  issues;
OECD, Quarterly  Labour  Force Statistics,  NO.4,  1990;  IMF, IBRD, OECD,
EBRO, The  Economy of USSR,  1990; L. Riveros,  Wage  and Employment
Policies  in Czechoslovakia,  PRHEE, World  Bank, 1991, processed;  C.
Burda,  Labor  and Product  Markets  in  Czechoslovakia  and  the  Ex-GDR: A
Twin  Study,  INSEAD,  1991, processed;  L. Fox, Labor Markets  in
Bulgaria:  Policies,  Institutions,  and Result-s.  EM4HR,  World  Bank,
1991, processed;  World Bank, Poland:  Employ!eit  Promotion  and
Services  for a Markec  Economy,  1990.
Notes:  Agriculture  comprises  ISIC Major division  1:  agriculture,
hunting,  forestry,  and  fishing;  Industry  comprises  ISIC Major  divisions
2-5: mining  and quarrying;  manufacturing;  electricity,  gas and water;
and construction.  Services  comprise  ISIC Major divisions  6-9 plus 0:
wholesale  and retail  trade,  restaurants  and hotels;  transport,  storage
and communications;  financing,  insurance, real estate  and business  services;
community,  social  and personal  services;  and activities  not adequately
defined.  Data  for Soviet Union  and Bulgaria  refer to 1988;  for Hungary,
to 1985.
7expansion, which has already begun.  By 1990, services had
increased their share in value-added by 9 pexcentage points over
1987 (Ministry of Planning 1992).
LowMAbiLily.  Geographically, workers in Slovenia and other
Eastern European countries are much less mobile than workers in
the OECD countries  (table 5).  The lack of a functioning housing
market  in these economies has been a major impediment to
TABLE  5:  RELATIVE  ka-TES  OF  MIGRATION
(people  who  migrated  as  a  percentage  of  total  population)
Interregional  migration  (a)  Total  migration  (b)
Slovenia  (1989)  0.24  2.2
Yugoslavia  (1989)  0.25  1.4
Hungary  (1989)  ---  1.9
Poland  (1989)  --  1.6
OECD  countries  (1987)




Sweden  3.9  ---
United  Kingdom  (1986)  1.1
United  States  2.8
Sources:  Statistical  Yearbook  of Slovenia,  1990;  Federal Statistical
Office  of Yugoslavia;  Statistical  Yearbook  of Hungary,  1989;  Poland:
Employment  Promotion  and Services  Project  (Report No. 9408-POL),  May
1991, World  Bank;  OECD  Employment Outlook,  OECD, Paris,  July  1990.
Notes:
(a) Regions  in Yugoslavia  are republics  and autonomous  provinces;
definitions  in other countries  vary  (in Germany,  for example,
cities may be called  regions).
(b) Total migration  is defined as any change  of permanent  residence
(within  the country).
8geographic mobility  (Renaud 1990).7  Furthermore, the labor
turnover  (job-changiag) rate in Slovenia is lower than in most
OECD countries, although it is also (for somewhat different
reasons) lower than in the other Eastern European economies  (r8e
table 6).
TABLE 6: LABOR TURNOVER,  1975-89
(Annual number of separations per 100 employees)
1975  1980  1985  1989
Slovenia  16.3  16.2  13.7  12.2
Socialist countries
Yugoslavia  14.6  14.3  12.6  11.3
Poland  21.7  18.3  17.9  19.8
Hungary  ---  ---  24.4
Czechoslovakia  ---  ---  17.9  19.6
Bulgaria  ---  ---  ---  21.0
Soviet  Union  (a)  ---  ---  ---  21.2
OECD countries
France  ---  17  18  (b)
Germany  25  30  ---
Italy  (a)  14  15  ---  ---
Japan  16  14  14 (b)
Sweden  (a)  21  20  17  tb)
U.K.  (a)  30  25  21 (b)
U.S.  (a)  50  48  ___
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia; Statistical Yearbook of
Czechoslovakia; Statistical Yearbook of Poland; Statistical Yearbook
of Hungary; World Bank, Bulgaria: Crises and Transition to a Market
Economy (Report No. 9046-BU, 1991 L), 1991; IMF, World Bank, OECD,
EBRD, A Study of the Soviet Economy, 1991; OECD, Flexibility  in the
Labor Market  (The Current Debate), 1986.
Notes:  (a) MInufacturing only
(b) 1984
7/  According  to Rue  (1992), however,  about  10 percent  of Slovenian
workers --  relatively skilled  workers --  have emigrated to the West
in the last three decades.
9Egalitarian Waae Structure.  As in other Eastern European
economies, ideological forces have led to a compression of the
wage structure in Slovenia.  Prasnikar and Svejnar  (1988,  p.
279), for example, note that the pay differential between skilled
Yugoslav workers and managers, on the one hand, and unskilled
workers, on the other, is smaller than in capitalist firms.  This
tendency was reinforced by worker participation in decision-
making about pay. 8
Generous Fringe Benefits.  Like other Eastern European work-
ers, Slovenian workers are entitled to generous nonwage benefits.
Some benefits --  such as health care, pension plan, paid
vacations, and paid sick and maternity leave --  are also common
in the West.  But some benefits --  especially paid sick and
maternity leave --  are far more generous than in the typical
market economy.  Also, Slovenian workers, like workers elsewhere
in Eastern Europe, are eligible for a variety of employer-
provided benefits  (such as free meals, transportation to and from
work, and subsidized housing) that are rare in the West.
Government Involvement in Wage Determination.  Because of
ill-defined property rights in the socialist economies, the
interests of owners  (employers) are poorly represented in
collective bargaining. To countervail workers' calls for wage
For  a  de3cription and  evaluation of  the  effects of  worker
participation  in  pay  decisions,  see  Vodopivec  (1992a).
10increases, the government is called in. 9 (Until recently,
Slovenian incomes policy tied the growth of the wage bill to
growth in the cost of living --  see below.)
2.  RECENT SHIFTS IN LABOR ALLOCATION
Sweeping legislative changes (see below) and a dramatic
change in the climate of the Slovenian economy --  of which the
best indicators are the emergence of opposition parties and the
election of the first noncommunist government in the spring of
1990 --  have produced major shifts in labor force allocation
(table 1).  Most conspicuously, social sector employment
decreased 17.6 percent from December 1989 to December 1991,
shedding workers primarily to unemployment and retirement  (few
firms have been privatized, so the shrinking of the social sector
should be attributed to attrition, layoffs and bankruptcies).
Moreover, private nonagricultural employment grew strongly in
1991.  The number of persons in the labor force decreased by a
spectacular 4.6 percent in 1990 and 3.4 percent in 1991, and the
labor force participation rate dropped by nearly 8 percentage
points between December 1989 and December 1991.
The most notable consequence of the shedding of labor from
the social sector so far has been a dramatic increase in unem-
ployment.  After stable unemployment of 1.5 percent in the mid-
1980s and creeping unemployment in 1988 and 1989, unemployment
9/  Government  regulation  of wages  in  socialist economies  is a long
established  practice.  Its  history  is  summarized,  in Vodopivec
(1991a).
11has exploded since 1990, soaring to 91,000  (9.7 percent) by
December 1991, a nearly threefold increase in just two years. 10
Unemployment showed some signs of  stabilization in the first half
of 1992, but it has been increasing steadily since July 1992,
reaching a record high of about 12.5 percent by January 1993
(118,000 registered unemployed).
Plant closures have also become, for the first time, an
important source of unemployment.  Since the fill of 1989, the
number unemployed because of plant closures has increased rapid-
ly, reaching 20,000 in December 1991.
3.  RECENT  INSTITUTIONAL  CHANGES
Reform  legislation enacted in 1988/89 still under the old
Yugoslavia  (above all, the Enterprise Law and the Labor Code)
provides the basis for restructuring the labor market.  The most
important new labor market policies involve employment,
redundancy, and unemployment insurance legislation, wage-setting
policies, and active labor market policies  (described below).
Many measures adopted in Slovenia are strikingly similar to
measures that have been adopted in other former socialist
countries undergoing transition to a market economy.
*  Emplovment Legislation.  The Labor Code has introduced
many important changes.  Hiring has been freed from external
constraints, and the procedures for hiring have been simplified.
IO/  But, according to a  labor market survey, 42.5 percent of the
unemployed  performed  some  paid  work in 1990 (Svetlik  1992).
12Reassignment of workers within a firm has become more flexible,
and it is now possible for a worker to be temporarily assigned to
another firm.  Legal possibilities for part-time work and fixed-
term employment have been broadened.  And the March 1992 pension
law calls for a gradual increase in the normal pensionable age
from 60 to 63 for men, and from 55 to 58 for women  (the ages are
65 for men, and 60 for women, for workers with insufficient
working years).  This last will reduce the fiscal burden of
pensions.
Redundancy Legislation.  Current legislation governing
layoffs  (or "technological redundancies,,"  as they are called)
represents one of the most radical breaks with the past to date.
It emerged in two steps:
October 1989 -_Februaryv1991.  The Yugoslav labor code
of October 1989 gave employers the right to lay off workers, but
made layoffs very costly.  A firm could lay off a worker only
after providing him or her with one of the following  (Art. 21 of
the federal labor code; the Slovenian labor code of April 199.
simply adopted the federal provisions):
a)  Placement in another firm;
b)  Retraining or upgrading for a position in the same
or in another firm (in training, the worker
received a personal income of no less than minimum
wage);
c)  The purchase of pension credits, if within five
years of retirement;
13d)  Severance  pay amounting  to at least  24 months  of
the worker's  personal  earnings  (average  monthly
earnings  in the last  quarter),  contingent  upon the
resources  being  used either  to finance  the
creation  of a small  business  or to obtain
employment  in a firm  through  the purchase  of its
shares;
e)  Compensation  of at least  the  minimum  wage payable
for  not more  than 24 months,  if none of the above
options  was implemented. (This  option  has been
referred  to as "paid  vacation,"  since  workers
receiving  such  compensation  have  typically  not
worked.)
The responsibility  for financing  the options  of redundant
workers  was left  to the firm,  but the Labor  Code  allowed  for
external  financial  assistance. In 1990,  Slovenian  firms  were
reimbursed  about  50 percent  of the costs  incurred  in financing
these  options (from  both  federal  and republic  funds)  ."
February  1991  to Present. Further  changes  were
introduced  by the amendments  to the Slovenian  labor  code  passed
in February  1991.  The most significant  innovation  associated
with this law  was a reduction  in the  benefits  to which
"technologically  redundant"  workers  are entitled. Most  notably,
it/  In  1990, the  Slovenian government cofinanced 21,223 redundant
workers.  Of these, 172  were trained  and placed in another firm;
1,082  chose  early  retirement;  2,499  received  a  lump-sum  payment;  and
17,470  were  on "paid  vacation."
14the amendments  call  for reducing  the period  of advance
notification  about  the layoff  from 24 to 6 months. Redundant
workers  now have the following  options:
a)  Reassignment  within  a firm (including  to a job
that  requires  fewer  skills,  with the worker's
consent);
b)  Retraining  or skill  upgrading  (to  last  for  up to 6
months);
c)  Purchase  of pension  credits,  if within  5 years  of
retirement;
d)  Compensation  of at least  the minimum  wage  payable
for  not more than 6  months.
Upon termination  of employment,  redundant  workers  are also
entitled  to severance  pay of one month's  earnings  for each year
of employment  with the current  employer.
In the case  of mass layoffs,  firms  have  to prepare
restructuring  programs  that include,  among  other  things,  the
identification  of redundant  workers  together  with  the options
they  are taking.  1 2 Decisions  about  the restructuring  program,
including  decisions  about  redundant  workers,  rest  with the worker
council (in  social  enterprises)  or with  the manager (in  private
12/  Mass layoff  is  defined  as a layoff  of at least  the following  number
of workers  during  consecutive  45 days:  10 workers,  in a firm  with
fewer  than 100  workers;  10 percent  of the  workers,  in a firm  with
100 to 300 workers;  and 30 workers,  in a firm  with more than 300
workers.
15enterprises).13  If the trade  union  does not agree  with the
program,  it  may initiate  an arbitration  procedure. The
arbitration  committee  (comprising  an equal  number  of
representatives  of the employer  and employees)  has the final
word.  The influence  of managers  of social  enterprises  is
substantial: they identify  redundant  workers,  and, in the case
of non-mass  layoffs,  also  make  decisions  about  the layoff." 4
A key component  of reform  in other  Eastern  European
countries  has also  been to enact  redundancy  legislation,  thus
ending  the era of virtually  complete  job sLcurity. Poland's
labor  code,  for example,  calls  for advance  notice  of up to 90
days  when an individual's  employment  is to be terminated,  and an
additional  45 days of advance  notice  to labor  unions  and
employment  offices  in the event  of a mass layoff.
UnemRlovment  Insurance  Berefits. The February  1991  law
on unemployment  insurance  (Official  Gazette  of the Republic  of
Slovenia,  May 1991),  gives  unemployed  workers  the right  to:
a)  Unemployment  compensation;
b)  Unemployment  assistance;
13/  Criteria  for identifying  redundant  workers  are spelled  out in the
general  collective  bargaining  agreement  of August  1990.  They are
(in  order  of priority):  work  quality  (productivity),  qualification,
work experience,  seniority,  health,  and social  factors (number  of
dependents,  whether  it  might  be possible  for  the  individual  to  work
on a farm  or become  self-employed,  and  whether  the individual  is  an
owner  or part-owner  of a  mixed  or private  firm).
14/  To  get rLd  of the  influence of worker councils, many social
enterprises  transfer  their assets  and  workers,  and thus all their
operations,  to a newly created subsidiary  that is considered  a
private  company  and  thus  need  not  have  a  worker  council. The  parent
enterprise  is transformed  into  a  purely  financial  institution  (see
Korze 1991).
16c)  Training;
d)  Reimbursement  for  moving  expenses  connected  with
reemployment;
e)  Health  and age insurance  (for  up to a year).
Individuals'  eligibility  to collect  unemployment  compensa-
tion is affected  both by the previous  level  of earnings  and by
the duration  of their  previous  employment. 15 For the first  three
months  of unemployment,  the benefit  equals  70 percent  of the
worker's  monthly average  earnings  over  their  last  three  months
of employment;  it is 60 percent  thereafter. Compensation  has
both  a ceiling (400  percent  of the minimum  wage)  and floor (80
percent  of the minimum  wage).
Workers  may collect  capitalized  unemployment  compensation  as
a lump-sum  payment,  provided  they  use the resources  to find
gainful  employment  (either  permanent  employment  or self-
employment). There  were 3,468  such cases  in 1991.  The majority
found  employment  by investing  in (social,  private,  or mixed)
enterprises;  about 16 percent  started  their  own business.
After  their  right  to unemployment  compensation  expires,
unemployed  workers  are eligible  for income-tested  unemployment
assistance. The same amount  is paid to all  unemployment  assist-
ance  recipients  (80  percent  of the  minimum  wage)  and the benefit
IS/  Unemployment  compensation  lasts  3 months  for  at least  9 months  of
uninterrupted  employment,  or  for  at  least  12  months  of  employment  in
the  last  18  months;  6  months  for  at  least  30  months  of  uninterrupted
employment,  or for  at least  50  months  in  the last  5  years;  9  months
for  employment  above  5  years,  but  less  than 10  years;  12  months  for
employment  above 10 years,  but less than 15 years;  18 month.  for
employment  above  15  years,  but less  than  20  years;  and  24  months  for
employment  above  20 years.
17is payable  for up to three  years  from  the date the individual
first  receives  unemployment  compensation.
Coinciding  with the passage  of laws  permitting  the dismissal
of workers,  other  Eastern  European  countries  have also instituted
unemployment  insurance  schemes. Like Slovenia,  most have chosen
to provide  earnings-related  benefits,  with limits  on the maximum
and minimum  amounts  payable.  Moreover,  the share  of earnings
replaced  by unemployment  benefits  has been  made a declining  func-
tion of the duration  of unemployment,  and the potential  duration
of benefits  is limited. The unemployed  are also  entitled  to
other  benefits,  such  as free  training,  loans  or grants  for the
development  of micro-enterprises,  and reimbursement  of relocation
expenses (Hungary,  Poland).
0  WaQe Setting. The old system  of wage setting  has
recently  been  dismantled  and replaced  by a system  with three
compornents:  the Labor  Code,  collective  bargaining,  and incomes
policy.  (The  last  component  is currently  inactive.)
In principle,  the Labor  Code  removes  administrative  con-
straints  on the wage bill,  as well as collective  decisionmaking
about  the wage scale.  It authorizes  managers  to determine  wages,
thereby  significantly  simplifying  procedures. The law  also gives
workers  the right  to a "guaranteed"  personal  income  --  that is, a
minimum  wage (to  be determined  either  by law  or in collective
bargaining  agreements).  16
16/  Currently,  the law  sets  the  minimum  wage at 60 percent  of the mean
net earnings  of the social  sector  in the  previous  six  months.
18The law also introduces collective bargaining --  a genuinely
new component --  into the system of wage setting.  The law allows
for general, industry, and enterprise collective agreements, and
specifies,  in general terms, the content of the agreements and
procedures for settling grievances and disputes.
The first general agreement for Slovenia was ratified in
August  1990; 28 more industry agreements have been accepted since
then.  17 The general agreement was agreed upon by the Chamber of
Economy of Slovenia and the "old," official trade union.  This
trade union has been increasingly challenged by two emerging
general unions  (particularly in certain regions), as well as
several other craft unions.
The general agreement for Slovenia calls for classifying
workers in nine categories, and prescribes the minimum basic wage
for each category.  The basic wage for the highest category is
three times that of the lowest category.  The agreement
prescribes wage indexation, with incomplete indexation for cost-
of-living increases of more than 5 percent a month.
The third component of the wage-setting system, an incomes
policy, is not currently active.  When the Incomes Policy Law
expired in February 1992, there was fierce opposition to its
17/  The agreements  also  regulate,  among  other  things,  the institutions
and procedures  for selecting  new workers;  items  covered  under  the
individual  job contract;  the probationary  period  and internship;
internal deployment of  workers; procedures and  criteria for
selecting  technologically  redundant  workers;  work  hours;  night-time
work; such fringe benefits as regular and special leave; work
safety;  education  and  training  benefits;  organization  and  rights  of
the trade  union  within  the firm;  and the settlement  of grievance.
and  disputes.
19extension." 1 Trade  unions,  its main  opponents,  argued  that  the
existence  of collective  bargaining  made separate  legal  restric-
tions  on the  wage  bill  not  only  unnecessary,  but
counterproductive  --  because  they  conflicted  with  collective
agreements.  (Not surprisingly,  real  wages  have  increased
dramatically  since  then  --  see below.)
Similarities  between  Slovenia  and  other  Eastern  European
economies  extend  to wage  setting.  Collective  bargaining  has
emerged  in all  other  ex-socialist  economies,  with  the  same  kind
of confrontation  among  unions  for worker  representation  as in
Slovenia. All the other  Eastern  European  countries  have
introduced  incomes  policies;  in Bulgaria,  Hungary,  and Poland,
these  have taken  the form  of so-called  tax-based  incomes
policies. Moreover,  minimum  wage scales  for  different  categories
of labor,  like  those  in Slovenia,  have been  agreed  upon in
Bulgaria  and Poland.
e g  iActive Labor  Market  Policies.  In addition  to
traditional  training  programs,  several  new programs  were
introduced  in 1991  to provide  hiring  and employment  subsidies,  to
create  temporary  public  sector  jobs  for the unemployed,  and to
provide self-employment.
Training.  Programs  exist  for  both the unemployed  and
Is/  The 1991 incomes  policy  law  contained  the growth  of socially-owned
firms'  wage bill  by tying  the  growth  of the  wage bill  to growth  in
the  cost of living. The  law  called  for  the le-than-proportional
growth  of the  wage  bill,  if the cost  of living  grows  faster  than  5
percent a month.  The law also limited managerial  salaries  by
constraining  the  wage  of the  highest-paid  individual  at  the  firm  to
be less  than 15 times  the  minimum  wage.
20the employed,  with separate  programs  for invalids. Two basic
types  of training  for the unemployed  are regular  training  and
internship.
a)  Regular  training,  open  to all the unemployed,
takes  the form  mainly  of vocational  training
(provided  by a specialized  training  institution  or
by the employer  through  on-the-job-training).
General  education  is less  common. Training  has to
be approved  by the employment  office  staff;  all
costs (including  transportation  and  meals)  are
covered  by the employment  office.
b)  Internship  takes  the form  of on-the-job-training,
under a fixed-term  employment  contract,  of six to
twelve  months.  Eligible  are first-time  job
seekers  who have  completed  a three-year  vocational
school,  high school,  or university  (the  so-called
interns  --  "pripravniki").  There  is a mandatory
examination  at the end of training.
Since 1988,  the government  has also  cofinanced  the training
of employed  workers.  It mostly  takes  the form  of customized
training (of  4-5  months),  but also includes  general  education.
To be eligible  for government  financial  assistance,  firms  must
prepare  restructuring  programs,  detailing  their  training  needs.
With the increase  in unemployment,  the number  of people  in
training  has increased  significantly  since  1989,  severely
straining  existing  training  capacity. There  were 9,000
21partic 4 .pants  in training  for  the unv3mployed  in 1990  and 17,000  in
1991 (about  70 percent  of them  as inturns),  compared  with only
4,800  in 1989 (60  percent  interns'.  Similarly,  the number  of
employed  workers  who underwent  training  increased  from 5,600  in
1988  to 20,000  in 1989,  21,000  in 1990,  and 46,500  in 1991.19
Compared  with other  Eastern  European  economies,  Slovenia
seems  to have relatively  well-developed  training  programs,  and
proportionally  more of its unemployed  enroll  in training.
Hirina  and Emplovment  Subsidies. 20 In response  to mounting
unemployment,  the Ministry  cf Labor introduced  several  other
programs  to help the unemployad. One of them is a lump-sum
subsidy (of  about $2,000)  to employers  who permanently  hire an
unemployed  person.  In 1991,  3,300  jobs  were created  through  that
subsidy.
Another  program,  introduced  in mid-1991,  amounts  to
employment  subsidies  to financially  distressed  firms. To
alleviate  the consequences  of collapsing  trade  within  former
Yugoslavia,  the government  suspended  the initiation  of bankruptcy
proceedings  by the Social  Accounting  Agency (SDK)  in the middle
of 1991,  thereby  practically  freezing  the initiation  of
bankruptcies. The government  not only  relieved  those  firms  from
19/  The  economic performance  of  the  firms applying for  financial
assistance  was  typically  below  average,  but  many better-performing
firms  -also  applied.  See "Work Report of Employment  Office of
Slovenia,"  various  years.
Employment subsidies are  applied to  a  stock  of  employment
(subsidization  of a worker  during  the entire  time of employment);
hiring  subsidies  are  applied  to flow  into  employment  (subsidization
of employment  during  the initial  period  of employment).
22taxation  and paying  the electricity  bills,  but also  granted  them
direct  subsidies  (some  as cofinancing  of training  and early
retirement). Employment  subsidies  represented  47 percent  of
expenses  for labor  market  programs  in 1991,  compared  with 14
percent  spent  on the true creation  of jobs (similar  proportions
apply  for 1992).21 Total  subsidies  amounted  to 12.1  billion
tolars (5.6  billion  in unpaid  taxes,  3.8  billion  for  unpaid
electricity,  and 2.8  billion  in direct  subsidies),  significant
3.5  percent  of GDP.n
According  to the Ministry  of Planning,  without  the
suspension,  by August  1992  bankruptcy  would  have been initiated
in 245 enterprises,  affecting  99,700  workers,  many of whom  would
have become  unemployed. In addition,  219 enterprises,  employing
60,000  workers,  faced  serious  liquidity  problems.
Public  Employment  Programs. A public  employment  program  was
initiated  in 1991  to create  special  jobs for  the unemployed
(subject  to the approval  of the Republic  Employment  Office  and in
cooperation  with local  government).  3  The jobs  were strictly  of
limited duration, with earnings  comprising, besides unemployment
21/  According  to Bole (1992),  the collapse  of the Yugoslav  market  has
caused  Slovenian  GDP to shrink  only 6  percent,  so its  pressure  on
layoffs  and  unemployment  has  been  limited.
22/  Data for unpaid taxes and electricity  --  Ministry of Planning
(1992);  data on direct  subsidies  --  Work Report  of the Employment
Office  of Slovenia  1991.
The  term  public  employment  as  used  here  encompasses  not  only  public
service  employment,  but  also  specially  created  jobs  in  other  areas.
(Public  employment  should,  of course,  be distinguished  from  social
sector  employment,  which  means employment  in enterprises  that are
socially  owned.)
23compensation,  a special  bonus  financed  by the local  government  as
an incentive  for  participation. Such  programs  were implemented
in four  areas:  social  protection  (for  example,  providing  child
care  and assistance  to the elderly);  education  and culture;
environmental  clean-up;  and  municipal  services.
Self-Emyloyment  Proarams. In addition  to a lump-sum  payment
of unemployment  compensation,  in 1991  the government  also began
to stimulate  self-employment  of the unemployed,  through  free
advisory  programs. The unemployed  receive  training  on the
organizational,  legal,  and financial  aspects  of beginning  self-
employment  (such  as preparing  a business  plan,  registering  their
business,  and getting  access  to credits  and business  space),  as
well as assistance  in implementing  specific  ideas.  A special
advisory  network  has been  organized  by regional  employment
offices,  drawing  also  on external  expert  groups.  In 1991,  more
than 2,000  people  were included  in various  advisory  and training
programs,  and 200 new  programs  were launched.
Linked  to the above  are "enterRrise  incubator"  programs,
through  which  the government  provides  the  professional  and
financial  assistance  needed  to launch  entrepreneurial  projects.
Incubators  have  operated  mainly  within  large  enterprises  facing
declining  demand  for their  products. The task of incubators  is
to inspire  and identify  entrepreneurial  ideas,  and to offer
advice  and assistance  in developing  them,  thereby  replacing  jobs
in unprosperous  lines  of business  with jobs  in prosperous  ones.
244.  PROBLEMS PLAGUING THE LABOR MARKET
Although the labor market has improved greatly in recent
years, pressing problems still plague it.  Workers are still
overprotected, counterproductively encouraged to exit early from
the labor market, and given generous fringe and cash benefits;
collective bargaining is inefficient; the escalation of wages
after the abolition of incomes policy threatens to fuel
inflation; and some active labor market policies aLe hindering,
rather than encouraging, the reallocation of labor.
(1)  Inionsistent. overrestrictive Redundancy Policy.
Although the Labor Code allows firms to lay workers off, it
imposes heavy costs for doing so, which discourages layoffs. 2 '
For one thing, firms bear most of the burden of financing
"technologically redundant" workers (training, purchasing pension
credits, and providing up to six months of "paid vacation" and
severance pay).  Moreover, current legislation encourages costly
rent-seeking.  The legislation discriminates between firms in
good financial standing  (which can declare "technological
redundancies") and those in poor financial standing  (which
produce "economic redundancies" by going through bankruptcy).
Healthy firms, when laying off workers, bear a heavy burden, and
external assistance is only optional.  On the other hand, firms
goi r'  through bankruptcy have no financial obligation for the
workers they lay off.  Such discrimination encourages firms in
24/  Hiring is  also  affected. The cost  of layoffs,  by raising  the  cost
of labor,  reduces  the  demand  for  labor.
25good standing to circumvent the law by initiating bankruptcy
proceedings.  But exploiting this loophole requires wasting real
resources  --  for exampla, in unnecessary administrative
procedures --  and damages a firm's reputation.  Moreover, the
practice undermines good will and the system's general
credibility.
The February 1991 legislation shortened the layoff
procedure, but employers still face procedural hurdles in laying
off workers.  Not only does the rehabilitation program have to be
submitted to employment offices, but flexible adjustment must
survive any trade union objections and whatever arbitration
ensues.
To prevent  further  growth  of  unemployment,  the  government
has  been encouraging early retirement by contributing up to 50
percent of the funds required to purchase the missing pension
credits  (early retirement started at age 50 for women, 55 for
men).  Many workers have opted to retire and leave the labor
force.  As a result, the ratio of employed workers to retirees
has decreased from 2.6 in December 1989 to 2 in December 1991
(see table 1).
In the words of Mitchell (1992, p. 31), "retirement systems
are not well-suited  to solve unemployment problems."  She
advocates actuarially reduced benefits for early retirement, and
gives the following arguments against generous early retirement
programs:
*  Decreased participation in the labor force, resulting
26in the perpetuation of wage rigidities, and thus increased, not
decreased, joblessness.  (To which one can add that decreased
participation  in the labor force because of early retirement
decreases the level of unemployment and hence its importance in
disciplining workers).
*  Failure to improve the demand for young workers  (if the
substitution between old and young workers is low, as seems to be
the case).
*  An increased fiscal burden on current and future
workers, and thus reduced demand for labor.
Despite reduced demand for labor, few enterprises have
shortened work hours or introduced other flexible job
arrangements, such as job-sharing.
(2)  Lack of Incomes Policy
In line with falling production  (GDP decreased by 2.6
percent in 1990 and an estimated 15 percent in 1991) the average
real wage decreased 10.5 percent in 1990 and 12.4 percent in 1991
(Ministry of Planning 1992).  But  1992 brought a dramatic
reversal:  although production is still falling, the average real
wage increased 40 percent between February and August.
As the recent escalation of wages shows, the absence of an
incomes policy --  while social ownership persists --  is likely to
produce wage drift and thus fuel inflation.  Under the present
conditions  (W.ith  pending privatization as an additional
stimulus),  1  crMS  tiave  strong incentives to pay higher wages even
if they default on other obligations  (for example, payments for
27inputs, taxes, and repayment of credits), thus creating
inflationary pressures.
(3)  Inefficient Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining and the agreements that result from
it, suffer from a lack of trust among the principal agents, auto-
matic cost-of-living adjustments, overly structured wages, and
inappropriate representation of the parties involved in
bargaining.
Lack of Trust and Cooperation.  Despite signing agreements
that resembled all-encompassing agreements, the major actors in
collective bargaining --  trade unions, the Chamber of Economy,
and the government --  have acted in an uncoordinated, sometimes
hostile, way.  For example, there was a two-hour general strike
in March 1992, and there have been many other strikes lately.  By
signing the collective bargaining agreements, and then
repudiating them through a more stringent Incomes Policy Law, the
government contributed to the climate of mutual distrust.  (The
meager support of parliament weakened the government's bargaining
position, which may have contributed to less fruitful
bargaining.)  There may be more frequent strikes, as well as
uneven growth in wages across sectors, the subsequent catching up
of those left behind, and a highly unstable macroeconomic
environment, as a result.
Autonq'tic  Cost-of-Livinct  Adjustment.  The experience of
other courrric,4  suggests that formally indexing wages leads to
rapid wage ad-,i  -. ri;ent  to infLation (see, for example, OECD 1987).
28Current bargaining agreements are bound to produce such a rapid
wage adjustment and thus rule out the real wage moderation that
may be necessary for successful reform.  Automatic cost-of-living
adjustments also make it impossible to adjust the current wage
structure, thus hindering the mobility of labor.
Overstructurina of Wages.  Slovenia's collective bargaining
contracts determine not only the minimum wage, but the minimum
level of pay for each worker --  the wage scale.  But the
administrative setting of wages decreases efficiency in at least
five ways.  (A) A wage scale produces misallocation of labor.  It
only takes into account (and only in a limited sense) the demand
for labor; it ignores the supply of labor.  More workers will be
unemployed because the firms' demand for labor is
administratively  constrained --  a classical objection against the
minimum wage legislation.  (B) The wage scale is likely to
accentuate the pay equalization effect of unions, thus hindering
inter-enterprise mobility of labor.  (C) As experience in the
Scandinavian  countries shows, a compressed wage structure also
fuels inflation  (OECD 1987).  (D)  The wage scale precludes
adjustment through voluntary wage cuts, and may force some firms
into bankruptcy.  (E)  Administrative wage scales may limit a
firm's ability to encourage long-term employment by offering
lower pay in the first years of employment and "overcompensating"
25/  To maintain  the support  of their  members,  unions  contribute  to pay
equalization  (see  Freeman  and  Medoff  1984).  The same tendency  of
wage  equalization  was  produced  under  self-management  (on  the  effects
of democratic  determination  of wages under self-management,  see
Vodopivec 1992).
29workers who stay with the rirm a long time.  In short, the
proposed administratively determined minimum wage structure only
appears to protect workers.  In a sense, it reintroduces the old-
style wage determination through the back door, with the same old
effect of misallocating  labor.
Inappropriate Representation in Bargaininc.  At the heart of
the issue is the problem of ownership.  The employers' interests
are represented by the Chamber of Economy.  But the Chamber is an
association of social enterprises, not an association of owners,
so its interests are not identical with those of private owners.
The interests of the Chamber coincide much more with those of the
government, which are broader than strict profit maximization.
The workers' side, at present, is also misrepresented.  The
"old,' official trade unions  are increasingly challenged by the
newly emerging unions, and the final balance of power --  and its
representation at the bargaining table --  has not yet been
determined.
(4)  overgenerous Benefits
Judging from experience in the OECD countries, current
unemployment compensation is too generous in terms of both the
replacement ratio and the length of time an entitlement is
effective  (see, for example, Barr 1990).  This not only creates
undue fiscal pressures; it also perversely affects incentives for
reemployment.  0
Moreover, the present pay system offers fringe benefits not
typically found in a  market economy (such as free meals,
30transportation to and from work, subsidized housing, and paid and
unpaid special leave).  These extra benefits introduce
inefficiency into the wage setting.  Firms prefer such in-kind
payments over cash because many of them are included in a firm's
costs and are thus tax-free.  Once the tax status of in-kind and
cash earnings is equalized, workers are likely to prefer the
cash.  Many of these in-kind benefits are relics of the past that
should be discouraged, if the goal is to provide undistorted
incentives for labor reallocation.
(5)  Lack of Coherent Active Labor Market Polioies
Some active labor market programs appear to be promising
(among them, public employment programs and hiring suosidies, if
the latter is buttressed by a sensible retention requirement).
Others need to be corrected or abolished.
Probably the most damaging --  and costly --  are employment
subsidies.  By granting employment subsidies and suspending
bankruptcies to preserve jobs and social peace, the government
resumed the paternalistic, redistributive role that it played for
decades  (see Kraft and Vodopivec 1992).  Although politically
expedient, such a policy is extremely damaging.  OECD  (1987,  p.
237) ranks the marriage of social and industrial policies as
first on the list of industrial policies that failed.2
Moreover, the program diverts resources earmarked for active
labor market policies and suffers from weak control  (for example,
26/  Vodopivec (1992b) attributes the failure of Yugoslavia's system to
the pervasive and massive policies of interfirm redistribution --
that is,  to  state  paternalism.
31for whether the funds are really spent for the purpose approved).
Most of the enterprises receiving employment subsidies repeatedly
knock at the government door.
The effectiveness of various training programs needs more
thorough evaluation than can be provided here.  Let us just
briefly mention one possible shortcoming of the internship
program --  the lack of retention requirement.  Since introduced
in 1989, financing of interns by the Employment Offices has, no
doubt, stimulated the employment of interns.  But since interns
are externally financed, firms have strong incentives to hire a
new intern to replace the one whose internship has ended.
(Indeed, most  interns have been refused permanent employment
when their internship ends, Work Report of the Employment Office
of  Slovenia 1990).
5.  LESSONS LEARNED
Slovenian labor market policies have confronted the major
problems of the economic transition, but not always
wholeheartedly or in the most efficient way.  To  evaluate current
labor market policies and practices requires in-depth research,
but some lessons --  particularly relevant for other economies in
transition --  are clear.V
Reallocate L-,bor  by the Creation of New Jobs. Not the
Preservatior of O0d.  As Slovenian experience shows, governments
27/  A thorough study of the determinants of labor market transitions in
Slovenli  iP  under  way (Abraham and Vodopivec 1991).
32in transitional economies tend to preserve current jobs through
employment subsidies, and to subsidize early retirement.  To
stimulate the efficient reallocation of labor, they should
redirect resources into job creation programs --  to keep the
employment preservation programs in check, exposing th.  to wide
public scrutiny may help.  Without relevant experience from other
countries to go by, the trial and error approach to finding the
right mix of active labor market policies is unavoidable. 28 But
governments should evaluate the effectiveness of such programs,
and weigh them against alternative policies aimed at reducing
unemployment --  notably increased public spending and investment
tax credits (see Palmer 1978).
Moreover, to increase the flexibility of adjusting firms'
workforces,  transitional economies should legislate simple layoff
procedures, and should not assign firms the responsibility for
financing redundant workers.
Retain Incomes Policy and Rationalize Wage Setting.  The
slovenian experience shows that while it may be easy to demolish
the old system of wage determination, it is difficult to build a
new, well-functioning  system, particularly during the transition.
One important lesson learned is the necessity --  while state and
social ownership prevail --  of curbing pay increases to prevent
wage drift.  Tax-based incomes policy, with taxes imposed on the
29/  Particular  attention  might  be paid  to job  search  assistance,  shown
to  be  the  most efficient assistance to displaced worker. in
developed  economies  (Leigh  1989).
33wage bill to stimulate labor cuts, may be a solution. 29 In the
long  run,  however,  small,  open,  highly  unionized  economies  should
try to steer  collective  bargaining  in the direction  of all-
encompassing  bargaining,  thus  making  incomes  policies
unnecessary.30
In setting  up a wage  determination  system,  no country  should
copy faithfully  the experience  of other  countries. Although  some
successful  economies  (Germany,  for example)  determine  wage
structures  by establishing  a floor  on wages for  different
categories  of workers,  doing se in transitional  economies  is
likely  to be counterproductive. 31 There,  the only  price of labor
that should  be fixed  is the  minimum  wage.  This  will allow
collective  bargaining  to achieve  wage moderation,  to produce  a
flexible  wage structure  and  thus to facilitate  the reallocation
of labor --  which is particularly desirable in the current
traLisition.  Automatic  cost-of-living  adjustments,  which  hinder
wage moderation  and  make the wage structure  inflexible,  should
also be avoided.
20/  Social  ownership not  only  encourages wage  drift,  but  also
jeopardizes  the  effectiveness  of a tax-based  incomes  policy.  If  a
firm  can "borrow"  to pay excess  wages,  it may be in a position  to
borrow even more to pay excess wages and taxes imposed  on wage
increaseo.  In  such circumstances,  agreeing to  general wage
increases  through  encompassing  bargaining  could  be  a  more  desirable
solution even in the short run --  but, unfortunately,  such a
solution  is  often  not  a feasible  one.
30/  Such  a system  is  practiced,  for  example,  in  Austria,  Germany,  Norway
and  Sweden, where widespread coverage and  highly centralized
bargaining  allow  the  benefits  of  wage  moderation  to be  shared  by  all
participants  in collective  bargaining  (Layard  1990).
31/  Another example of interference  in wage setting is provided  by
Armenia,  which  has  recently  contemplated  recommending  the  wage  scale
of civil  servants  to the rest  of the  economy.
34Build  SuPport  for  geform.  Unilateral  actior  by the
Slovenian  government  --  implicitly  relying  on inaction  by the
part of the trade  unions  --  has been  counterproductive: it is
both inadequate  and unsustainable. To overcome  mutual  hostility
and achieve  cooperation,  governments  in transitional  economies
should,  among  other  things,  consult  with  trade  unions  on the
legislation  and programs  to be introduced. This is particularly
important  for containing  wage  drift.
To maintain  support  for market-oriented  reform,  the
government  should  wage a continuous  public  relations  campaign  to
demonstrate  the unavoidability  of the reforms (as  the price  to be
paid for  the long-lasting  wrong  policies  of the past),  and the
government's  commitment  to facilitate  the needed  adjustment  by
encouraging  the efficient  reallocation  of labor  and by spreading
costs  equitably  among  different  segments  of the population. To
counterbalance  perceived  negative  developments  (such  as the
growth  of unemployment),  the government  should  emphasize
successes  (such  as people  getting  regular  employment  after
finishing  training  or public  employment  programs)  --Hirschman's
"tunnel"  effect.
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